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As biotechnologies and nanotechnologies are becoming paradigmatic of nowadays 
science, what happened to science as we (thought we) knew it? Are we witnessing a 
break of an epochal character? Science Transformed? is a collection of essays that 
revolve around the question whether recent science hallmarks an epochal break. 
The book is organized in two sections: the first one gathers essays that discuss the 
pertinence of the epochal break thesis as a whole, and the second provides empirical 
support to test the thesis in a number of fields: scientific experimentation practices and 
ideal-types, digital imaging media, robotics, medical research and computational 
modelling. The book ends on a series of ‘sticking points’ on which further research 
should focus. 
While each chapter adopts a singular vantage-point to address the epochal break 
issue, the book as a whole offers a coherent and well-organized panorama of the problem. 
Each contribution nicely responds to the others and they share conceptual tools taken 
from common bibliographical references: ‘mode-I/mode-II production of knowledge’ 
(Gibbons et al. 1994), science/technoscience (Hottois 2005) or Paul Forman’s shift from 
modernity—where the means of the scientific method culturally prevail over tech-
nological ends—to postmodernity—where ‘technology is simply all there is’ (Forman 
2007: 72) and sanctions the hegemony of purely utilitarian values. The introduction 
reviews the current trends of concepts used to describe the changes occurring in science: 
‘postnormal’ (Funtowicz and Ravetz 1993), ‘postacademic’ (Ziman 2000) or 
‘entrepreneurial science’ propelled by a university–industry–government ‘triple helix’ 
(Etzkowitz 1983; Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff 1998). But fortunately, the book does not 
propose new labels. Most of its articles are actually rather critical about the pertinence of 
using such catchwords: They are more normative than descriptive and tend to 
oversimplify the history of science and engineering. Whereas most of these expressions 
were forged to label transformations occurring in the social and political context of 
science policy and funding, this volume focuses primordially on the shifts occurring in 
the practices and the values of scientific research. The major purpose is rather to look for 
the argumentative and methodological patterns that are the most appropriate to address 
these issues. 
Amongst the contributions four different interpretations of the changes in recent 
science and technology are to be distinguished: (1) that there is an epochal break; (2) that 
today’s changes are more a matter of intensification rather than rupture; (3) that other 
patterns than epochal break should be proposed to reflect on science’s current 
transformations; (4) a rejection of the epochal break thesis. 
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(1)  The epochal break thesis to be discussed in the volume is articulated by Alfred 
Nordmann, who pleads for the recognition of a shift from the scientific enterprise to 
the regime of technoscience. With technoscience, he contends, it becomes neither 
possible nor required to discriminate between practical intervention in the world and 
theoretical representation of the world. Understanding and control are indistin-
guishable. 
In the first part of the book (where the burden of proof is heavier), most authors 
actually dispute this view. It is mostly in the second part that we find endorsements 
of Nordmann’s thesis. Angela Krewani, for instance, claims that contemporary 
imaging practices have ‘‘done away with the implied distance between image and 
viewer’’ to bring about ‘‘an ongoing conflation of viewer, apparatus, and image’’  
(p. 156). 
In their essay on experimentation, Astrid Schwarz and Wolfgang Krohn also provide 
support to the epochal break thesis by testifying to a shift from the ‘laboratory ideal’ 
to the ‘field ideal’ of experimentation. Such a shift, they argue, means that the old 
Baconian science-society contract is being replaced with a new one: scientific 
experiments are no more conducted only in the laboratory defined as a socially 
confined space; they are no more affecting society’s choice of options only by those 
originating from already approved scientific knowledge. The new science-society 
contract is defined as a process of ‘social experimentation’ engaging society as a 
giant laboratory where ‘real-world simulations’ are performed. 
That there has been an epochal break in biomedical science is also acknowledged by 
James Robert Brown. In his view, the feeling that the ‘good old days’ are over 
makes the shift obvious. Significant accomplishments for improving the quality of 
our lives are behind us (he takes the case of anti-hypertension drugs). The rule now 
is ‘follow the money’. However, while Brown warns us about the erosion of 
scientific quality under the influence of commercial interests, he is not willing to 
generalize his diagnosis to all medical science, and even less to all science: ‘‘People 
investigating the role of diet and exercise on depression resemble past researchers, 
just as physicists do’’ (p. 186). 
 
(2)  Some chapters argue for an incremental change rather than an epochal break. For 
instance Valerie Hanson in her study of digital imaging claims that though the 
transition from analog to digital practices may have induced a lot of incremental 
changes, it has not brought about a revolution in knowledge production and 
communication. 
An interesting intensification pattern is described by Martin Carrier. To him, the real 
technoscientific turn lays behind us: it was the scientific revolution. Modern science, 
he claims, has always pursued the technoscientific ambition of making and remaking 
the world. Consequently, instead of a new rupture, we are rather witnessing the con-
cretization and amplification of the effects of an epochal break that occurred 
centuries ago, and which delivers only now its bunch of promises and problems. As 
to the alleged replacement of understanding by control involved in Nordmann’s 
argument, Carrier considers it to be an epistemic strategy doomed to abortion and 
promised to an inglorious ending because of the lack of robustness and sustainability 
that its generalization would entail (a claim which is finely disputed by Ann Johnson 
and Johannes Lenhard’s contribution on computational modelling: by their very 
opaqueness and versatility, computational models, they argue, concretize a new 
culture of prediction that deliberately assumes missing sustainability). However, 
Carrier ends by remarking that a new ‘technoscientific turn’ might be found at the 
level of research objects’ ontology: Technoscientific objects like chlorofluoro-
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carbons, ferromagnetic materials, liquid crystals, light-emitting diodes or nano-
objects are not discovered in nature-in-self; they are simultaneously created by 
humans and explored like natural objects of they own right. But how uncanny these 
technoscientific objects might be ontologically, methodologically, Carrier maintains, 
they still need scientific knowledge in order to be controlled and used. 
 
(3)  Other chapters develop tentative alternative interpretations of what is going on in 
science: Hans Radder, like Carrier, considers interventionist ambitions as a perennial 
trait of modern science. He also finds the model of knowledge-as-control highly 
questionable regarding its epistemic validity. Instead of an epochal rupture between 
science and technoscience, Radder bases his diagnostic on the existence of novel 
and nonlocal patterns: the commoditization of academic culture (and the correlated 
erosion of its critical ethos); the increasing prevalence of external norms of validity 
(economic competitiveness and social acceptability). 
As to Andrew Jamison, he points out a transitional process of ‘changing contexts of 
science and technology’ from disciplinary ‘mode-1’ little science (before WWII) to 
multidisciplinary ‘mode 1.5’ big science (1940–1960s), and then to a ‘mode-2’ 
transdisciplinary technoscience (1970s-onward). But it does not mean that current 
technoscience opens up a new epoch. It could well be just a transition towards a 
‘mode-3’ research culture: a more desirable synthesis of disciplinary science and 
commercial technoscience. 
Chunglin Kwa makes the case for a pluralistic interpretation. Instead of accounting 
for today’s technoscience in terms of shifting relations between two entities 
(science/technology) he suggests a constellation of multiple scientific styles 
(Crombie 1994): deductive, experimental, taxonomical, analogical-hypothetical, 
statistical, historical-evolutionary. He then considers technology as a full-fledged 
style resulting from various alliances with other scientific styles, and taking different 
forms: theoretical engineering research, technological knowledge, invention, design, 
transfer or application from science, spatial thinking, analogical thinking, etc. 
Consequently the configurations are too diverse to give way for the prevalence of a 
single one over the others. Moreover, each partner maintains its identity, so as we 
are not witnessing an eclipse on the part of science. 
 
(4)  Most chapters in the book’s first part argue against the epochal break thesis. For 
Gregor Schiemann, the transition from medieval to early modern science has been 
perceived as an epochal break, only a posteriori, because a time lapse is required to 
understand the global significance of a process. ‘‘We always remain involved in the 
events of our times (p. 37)’’. For Schiemann, the departure from early modern 
epistemic norms of universality, necessity, and truth is a process that started in the 
nineteenth century and about which no one knows if it has come to an end. 
Schiemann also argues against the blurring of the divide between science and 
technology, nature and artefact, allegedly characteristic of today’s technoscience. 
Early modern science already disposed of the ancient distinction between physis and 
technè. The nature/technology divide changes, but it does not vanish. Nano-objects 
or the OncoMouse, for instance, are not purely human artefacts, they are still made 
of natural parts or are still organisms belonging to nature (though seriously damaged 
by humans). 
Cyrus Mody is even more sceptical. He picks out various examples in the history of 
science and engineering with the characteristic features of current technoscience: 
nuclear devices, game theory, Langmuir’s light bulb, Thompson’s telegraph and 
Galileo’s workshop. None of them was empirical engineering or applied science. All 
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of them already blurred the traditional frontiers of scientific disciplines and ethos. 
Therefore, Mody argues against any grand claims about epochal breaks: ‘‘There 
might be breaks, but they don’t seem very epochal, unless an epoch only lasts a 
generation or so’’ (p. 62). 
Finally, Mieke Boon and Tarja Knuutilla want to ‘break up with the epochal break’. 
On the basis of the epistemology of models, they argue that engineering science 
offers good rationale for breaking up, respectively, with the representing/intervening 
and basic/applied divides that are mistakenly taken as criteria of classic modern 
science or mode-I research. 
 
‘‘No one can leap beyond his own age’’, said Hegel. For sure, the only factual 
answer to the epochal break problem is that it cannot be settled as a matter of fact: A 
historical diagnosis is never neutral; it is an exercise engaging values within and from the 
present. Most contributions to Science Transformed? against the epochal break thesis 
actually warn us about the rhetoric that exploits the epochal break for legitimizing short-
term reorientations of the scientific enterprise: ‘‘Announcement of epochal breaks are 
often interested and have real consequences’’ (p. 10). Consequently, supporting the 
epochal break thesis would be tantamount to amplifying and supporting trends that are 
judged undesirable. 
Nordmann, by contrast, argues that technoscience is insensitive to historical self- 
understanding, so that is precisely denying the epochal break which amounts to endorsing 
the regime of technoscience: 
 
From the point of view of science and how it understands itself, hardly anything could be as 
dramatic as the shift to a technoscientific mode of research. From the point of view of 
technoscience, in contrast, the whole history of science and engineering research has always 
been technoscientific. (…) Those who deny the epochal break thesis have happily settled 
into the age of technoscience (p. 20). 
 
For Nordmann, seeing or not seeing an epochal break is therefore a matter of setting the 
proper distance: If one remains too close, immersed in the multiplicity of singular 
practices, any pretension to identify some overall shift will necessarily seem illegitimate. 
One should thus step back and take some distance, but not the too detached distance of 
positivist, analytical or purely formal epistemologies of science—rather a kind of 
‘engaged distance’—far enough to identify global patterns, close enough to be value-
sensitive. 
Here is a volume displaying a wide spectrum of arguments pro and contra the notion 
of epochal break. However, despite all its richness the way the book frames the question 
has its limits. All contributors seem to agree at least on one point: whether there is a shift 
towards technoscience or not, technoscience is not something highly desirable. 
Accordingly technoscience is essentially characterized in a negative way as: blurring of 
distinctions, nonsustainalibility and erosion of scientific ethos. What about the various 
changes that matter without being epochal, or traits of novelty that might be ‘slipping 
under the radar’ (p. 144)? The ontological specificity of technoscientific objects pointed 
out by Carrier and pinpointed as a ‘sticking point’ in Radder’s epilogue is too quickly 
discarded in favour of an interpretation essentially based on epistemological and 
historiographical considerations. Perhaps setting the proper distance is less important 
than identifying the ‘right’ one, ‘adjusting the focus’ to ‘do justice’ or to ‘render visible’ 
what deserves to be rendered visible. 
Another limitation of the book is that it seeks to capture a transformation on the 
basis of fixed definitions of what is being transformed. Let’s define science, and then we 
shall see how it has changed. Bergson’s criticism of all attempts aiming at reconstructing 
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an evolutionary process by starting from the processed or by combining processed 
elements could be relevant here. Similarly, one cannot start from the transformed—
science—to account for its transformations. Indeed it is not an entirely illegitimate 
inference but it will result in a diagnosis, not in a genesis. A diagnosis is about the normal 
and the pathological. It cannot do otherwise than fixing some characters in order to 
determine what has changed. Alternatively, a genesis would not presuppose a definition 
of science as the ‘subject of change’ and rather consider science or technoscience ‘in 
transformation’ and follow their process of stabilization in objects. 
Such is the perspective explored in the project GOTO ‘The Genesis and Ontology of 
Technoscientific Objects’ conducted by Bernadette Bensaude-Vincent, Sacha Loeve, 
Alfred Nordmann and Astrid Schwarz. Instead of discussing whether technoscience is an 
historical rupture or business as usual, the GOTO project assumes that: (1) 
Technoscience is a regime of research that is now dominant, although it can be 
instantiated in the past centuries; (2) At the ontological level, technoscience brings a 
specific mode of existence of objects (and of our co-existence with them) which is 
distinct from the mode of existence of scientific objects (Bensaude-Vincent et al. 2011) as 
well as from the mode of existence of technical objects; (3) Instead of arguing pro or 
contra technoscience, the main task is to appraise and tame alternative modes of 
togetherness, worldliness and coexistence with objects. 
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